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It is relatively easy to characterize the institutional structure of a country as consociational
or federal. The task is much more difficult if we turn from structure to the decision process.
Within a given structure, there may be a great deal of variation with regard to the decision
process. Data for such variation are given for the decision process in Switzerland for which
the following four types are distinguished: (I) consociational and federal, (2) consociational
and unitary, (3) competitive and federal, and (4) competitive and unitary. Difficulties are discussed
in aggregating from such a variation to a measure for the prevailing decision process in a coun-
try as a whole. It is suggested that the problem be disaggregated and that decision processes
be compared for particular issues. This can be done both across and within countries.
Within a given institutional structure, one may find a wide variety of deci-
sion processes. This is certainly true for consociational and federal struc-
tures. The argument of this article is that in talking about consociationalism
and federalism, we should distinguish more carefully between structure and
process. Much confusion in the literature results from the fact that the degree
of consociationalism and federalism in a country is often measured in an
indiscriminate way, incorporating both structural and process features. We
shall argue that structural and process elements cannot easily be aggregated
in a single measure. They require different research methods and, above all,
different levels of analysis.
What is the distinction between institutional structures and decision pro-
cesses? Structure refers to the entirety of written and unwritten rules within
which the decision process of a country operates. In the long run, these rules
may change, but in the short run, they are relatively stable so that it is ap-
propriate to refer to them as structural elements. The decision process refers
to the dynamic day-to-day interactions among the decisionmakers: how they
move an issue from arena to arena, the coalitions and bargains they form,
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the modes with which they make their decisions, and the way they imple-
ment these decisions.
In his contribution to this issue, Arend Lijphart limits himself to struc-
tural features in order to measure the degree of consociationalism and
federalism in a country. As an indicator for consociationalism he uses, for
example, the existence of oversized cabinets. Bicameralism is one of the in-
dicators for federalism. It is relatively easy to collect data on such structural
features and to reach agreement on the classification of particular countries.
As a country expert for Switzerland, Steiner would certainly agree with
Lijphart that from a structural perspective, Switzerland can be classified as
both a consociational and a federal case. We also do not deny that looking
at structural elements has an intrinsic value of its own. There is, for exam-
ple, research by David Cameron indicating that the degree of federalism
measured in structural terms has an influence on the policy outcome.1 Thus,
analyzing consociationalism and federalism from a structural perspective is
a legitimate enterprise.
The pitfalls begin when consociationalism and federalism are measured
simultaneously in structural and process terms, which is unfortunately the
common pattern in the literature. The classification of particular countries
then proceeds typically in the following manner: unsystematically chosen case
studies of decision processes are used to reinforce the classifications based
on structural data. This procedure would be appropriate if structure fully
determined process. Under these circumstances, it would indeed be sufficient
to deal with the process simply by providing some colorful illustrations. If,
for example, a country had a grand coalition and other structural features
of consociationalism, it would be sufficient to illustrate how this structure
is translated into the decision process through the use of a few examples.
But structure does not automatically translate into process. This point is
eloquently made in the articles by Ivo D. Duchacek and Daniel J. Elazar.
The latter argues with regard to federalism that' 'many polities with federal
structures were not all that federal in practice."2 Duchacek states that the
"admixture" of consociational and competitive decision modes may be dif-
ferent "at different times on different issues."3 We can now present some
new Swiss data, which support these general claims. The data are based on
interviews with 203 members of pre-parliamentary expert committees.4
These committees are considered a key structural element of Swiss consocia-
tionalism and federalism.5 From a consociational perspective, it is im-
'David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis,"
The American Political Science Review 72 (December 1978): 1243-1261.
2Elazar, pp. 17-34.
3Duchacek, pp. 35-48.
4For more information on the data base, see Raimund E. Germann and Jiirg Steiner, "Com-
paring Decision Modes at the Country Level," British Journal of Political Science 15 (January
1985): 123-126.
5Jiirg Steiner, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974).
Structure and Process 51
portant that all interested groups are usually represented in these expert com-
mittees. To be an "expert" in this context mainly implies being knowledgeable
about the interests of particular groups. From a federal view, it must be noted
that the cantons are always included among the interest groups represented
in the expert committees. It is a constitutional stipulation that the Confedera-
tion must hear the views of the cantons in this phase of the decision process.
Do these consociational and federal structural features of the expert com-
mittees also mean that the decision process in these committees is of a con-
sociational and federal nature? Initial case studies seemed to give a positive
answer. Steiner conducted a study of an expert committee, which dealt with
the question of federal subsidies to cantonal universities.6 Through partici-
pant observation, he determined that during more than two years of com-
mittee deliberations, conflicts were resolved by a majority vote only a single
time. Mutually acceptable compromises were reached in all other instances.
Furthermore, committee members often spoke as representatives of their
cantons.
Some recent case studies raise questions concerning the extent to which
the findings about this university expert committee have general validity. In
order to get a broader overview of the situation, Germann and Steiner under-
took the above mentioned interview survey of a representative sample of
expert committee members. The results show a surprising variation in the
way Swiss expert committees handle their internal decisionmaking process.
Recall data have obvious weaknesses, primarily due to faulty memories and
outright distortions. We have dealt with this methodological problem in
another paper.7 In the present context, the exact figures are less important
than the overall impression of a significant amount of variation in the inter-
view responses. One can certainly not infer from these data that consocia-
tionalism and federalism clearly dominate the decision process in Swiss
expert committees.
We look first at consociationalism. Asked how often consociational and
competitive decision modes are used, the committee members mentioned ma-
jority decisions slightly more often than consensus. Fifty-three percent of
the respondents said that it occurs "always" or "often" in their committees
that "a vote is taken and the proposal which gets a majority becomes the
decision." Forty-three percent answered that it happens "always" or "often"
in their deliberations that "the proposals are debated until one of the pro-
posals gets the explicit approval of all members." These data may be biased
in one direction or the other, but it would be impossible to make a case that
amicable agreement is the dominant decision mode in Swiss expert commit-
tees. This conclusion is reinforced if we look at the categories "rarely" and
"never," omitting the middle category "sometimes." A surprisingly high
number (29 percent) said that they "rarely" or "never" reach consensus in
Steiner, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule, pp. 129-165.
7Germann and Steiner, "Comparing Decision Modes at the Country Level."
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their committees. This figure certainly does not square with the notion that
Swiss expert committees operate mostly by amicable agreement.8
The findings are also ambivalent with regard to federalism. There is no
clear support for the claim that cantons are always important actors in the
decision process, although they are formally represented in all committees.
According to our interviews, only 7 percent of the respondents see themselves
primarily as representatives of a canton. In order to understand this figure,
one must know that in Switzerland most politicians accumulate several
political roles. Thus, a member of an expert committee, who was appointed
as a representative of a canton, is also likely to have important roles in a
political party and various interest groups. Involved in the daily decision pro-
cess of an expert committee, such a person may very well attach low impor-
tance to his cantonal role and high importance to some of his other roles.
It may even be that he has literally forgotten in which role he was originally
appointed to the committee, especially if this appointment occurred some
years back. Contributing to this uncertainty is the fact that sometimes per-
sons are appointed in several roles to an expert committee. It also happens
that an appointment is made without a clear specification of the exact in-
terest which the committee member is supposed to represent. This discus-
sion should indicate that it is not sufficient to look at the structural com-
position of Swiss expert committees. We must also see how the roles are de-
fined in the actual decision process. From this perspective, the cantons seem
to have less importance than one would expect from the structural features
of the committees. There are obviously many issues in Swiss expert commit-
tees in which the cantons have no clearcut interests and therefore do not ap-
pear as principal actors.
Summarizing with regard to both consociationalism and federalism, it
seems that we can identify the following four types of decision processes in
Swiss expert committees: (1) consociational and federal, (2) consociational
and unitary, (3) competitive and federal, (4) competitive and unitary. Thus,
we have substantial variation in a given structural arrangement. Clearly, struc-
ture is not automatically translated into process. We agree with Elazar's argu-
ment that we must distinguish between a process and a structural dimension.
This is what he does in his Figure 4 for federalism. On the one hand, for
structure, and on the other hand, for process, he classifies a large number
of countries along a federal-unitary dimension. According to this classifica-
tion, France has both a unitary structure and unitary process, Israel a unitary
structure but a federal process, the USSR a federal structure but a unitary
process, and Switzerland both a federal structure and process. We have no
problems with the classification on the structural dimension. But we are
uneasy about the process dimension. Elazar acknowledges that "we know
Q
Besides majority decisions and amicable agreement "decisions by interpretation" were another
frequently used decision mode for which we refer to another publication: Jiirg Steiner and Robert
H. Dorff, "Decision by Interpretation: A New Concept for an Often Overlooked Decision
Mode," British Journal of Political Science 10 (January 1980): 1-13.
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relatively little about federal processes." The classifications are called "ten-
tative" and "based on assessment of currently available evidence."9 For
Switzerland at least, there are many different ways to interpret the available
evidence. As more data become available, it becomes less clear as to how
much Swiss decision processes are federal or unitary. Sometimes the can-
tons are important actors, but often they are not. The main impression is
the great amount of variation from one decision process to another. The same
is true if we try to classify the overall decision processes as competitive or
consociational.
How can we arrive at a more systematic and reliable classification on the
process dimension for both federalism and consociationalism? Relying on
recall data, such as those presented in this article, will not be sufficient because
the potential distortions are simply too large.10 A more promising approach
would be to study a representative sample of actual decision cases. The prac-
tical difficulties of such an enterprise are, however, so formidable that we
are now less optimistic than in an earlier publication." At first, we would
have to determine the universe of all decision cases from which a represen-
tative sample could be drawn. This would presuppose that we define in a
clear way what we mean exactly by a decision case. How broad or how nar-
row should the definition be? Is, for example, the nuclear construction pro-
gram of a country a single case, or should we consider the construction of
each individual reactor as a separate case? We would also have to deal with
the question of the time period to which the sample of decision cases should
refer. Would five years or ten years be appropriate time spans? We would
further have to come to terms with the problem that some decision cases
are obviously of greater importance than others. This would mean that we
would have to attach different weights to the various cases. In principle, all
these problems may seem solvable. But having tried to take some steps in
this research direction, we now realize that the task is so formidable and the
resources so limited that it seems practically impossible to execute such a
project. We would need dozens, perhaps hundreds, of research assistants
to cover even a small number of countries for short periods of time.
What is the conclusion for future research strategies? Francis Castles pro-
poses that we limit cross-national research to structural features and neglect
the decision process because we cannot measure it reliably. Castles certainly
recognizes the importance of the decision process, noting that it "is not that
the agency is unimportant, but rather that it is frequently difficult to come
to grips with its manifestation in individual choices, strategies and manoeuvres
by means of the inherently generalizing methods of the social sciences." He
argues that such generalizing methods are "quite impossible in the context
9Elazar, pp. 17-34.
10See for a discussion of these distortions: Germann and Steiner, "Comparing Decision
Modes at the Country Level."
"Jiirg Steiner, "Research Strategies Beyond Consociational Theory," The Journal of Politics
43 (November 1981): 1241-1250.
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of cross-national comparative studies, which seek to describe and explain
highly aggregated patterns of political behaviour." Castles concludes that
"this leaves the proper study of policy outcomes as the description of vary-
ing patterns of policy and the location of the structural relationships which
underlie them."12
Although we share Castle's view that it is virtually impossible to describe
decision processes at the highly aggregated level of entire countries, his solu-
tion to neglect decision processes is unsatisfactory. Instead, one can lower
the level of aggregation so as to compare not entire countries but specific
issues. At this lower level of aggregation, it is feasible to describe the
decision process with some reliability and validity. Elsewhere, we have de-
scribed in detail the research strategies to be used if the units of analysis are
specific issues.13 In the present context, it is important to note that the deci-
sion process about specific issues can be classified on a continuum from con-
sociational to competitive and also on a continuum from federal to
unitary.14 Combining the two dimensions, we can distinguish various admix-
tures of consociational and federal decision processes.
Changing the units of analysis from countries to issues not only has the
advantage of higher reliability and validity, it also has theoretical benefits.
In particular, it is easier to determine whether variation in the decision pro-
cess has an effect on the policy outcome. One key question in the literature
on federalism is whether federal decision processes benefit some groups more
than unitary processes. In the consociational literature, the same question
is raised for the distinction between consociational and competitive decision-
making. To determine losers and winners is very difficult at the highly ag-
gregated level of entire countries. Moreover, it is problematic to relate causal-
ly, in a convincing way, the policy outcome of an entire country to a par-
ticular pattern in the decision process. This task is much easier if the units
of analysis are specific issues. At this level it is not too difficult to determine
the winning and losing groups. It is also easier to see how particular aspects
of the decision process could have a causal impact on the policy outcome.
Finally, working with issues rather than with countries allows us to in-
crease the number of cases so that hypotheses can be subjected to sophisticated
statistical tests. We can compare issues both between and within countries,
this allows us to determine the importance of process versus structural
variables, bringing us back to the basic theme of this article. With intra-
l2Francis G. Castles, "How Does Politics Matter? Structure or Agency in the Determina-
tion of Public Policy Outcomes," European Journal of Political Research 9 (1981): 129.
13Jiirg Steiner, "Decision Process and Policy Outcome: An Attempt to Conceptualize the
Problem at the Cross-National Level," European Journal of Political Research 11 (1983):
309-318.
l4We do not enter here the problem of the operational definition of the two dimensions. In
an ongoing project, we characterize decision processes about specific issues with some addi-
tional dimensions. See, Jiirg Steiner and Robert H. Dorff, "Decision Process and Policy Out-
come: An Attempt to Collect Data at the Cross-National Level" (Paper presented at the an-
nual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1984).
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country comparisons we can hold the institutional structure constant and
examine whether variation in the decision process makes a difference. Perhaps
structure is so important that the particular (in the words of Castles) "choices,
strategies and manoeuvres" of the decisionmakers have no significant effect
on the policy outcome. On the other hand, we can compare issues with the
same decision process across countries with different structural arrangements.
Here, we can see the possible effect of structural variation. Such intra- and
inter-country comparisons would give us a good basis if we wish to advise
politicians as to whether reforms should concentrate more on structural or
process features. In Switzerland at the present time, it is often suggested that
competition and federalism should be emphasized more. Would this primarily
require changes in the institutional structures or would it be more important
to encourage the decisionmakers to change their behavior within the given
structural arrangements? Not only from a theoretical, but also from a prac-
tical perspective, it seems important to make such a distinction between struc-
ture and process. The main point of this article is that this distinction should
be made more carefully in future discussions about consociationalism and
federalism.

